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I. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
HE United States Supreme Court, lower federal courts, Texas
courts, and the Texas attorney general all rendered decisions dur-
ing the survey period that significantly affected the public's access
to government information. The United States Supreme Court further ar-
ticulated the emerging first amendment right of access to government in-
formation in a criminal trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decided a case based on article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, de-
claring that the press and public had certain rights of access broader than
any previously articulated first amendment rights. Several cases involved
the State Open Meetings Act, and one case construed the state Open
Records Act. In addition, the attorney general responded to numerous in-
quiries as to whether government information must be divulged. Gener-
ally, the rights of the press and public to government information
expanded during the survey period.
A4. Courtrooms
In Globe Newspaper v. Superior CourtI the United States Supreme Court
struck down a Massachusetts statute that barred the public from juvenile
proceedings involving sex crimes. 2 Boston Globe reporters had been ex-
cluded from several preliminary proceedings in the trial of a man accused
of committing forcible rape and forced unnatural rape against three mi-
nors. Before trial the Globe moved the trial court to permit members of
the press and public to attend the trial and related proceedings. Pursuant
to the statute, the court refused and excluded the public and press from the
entire trial. At an emergency appellate hearing the Commonwealth of
*A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boston University. Attorney at Law, Jackson,
Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Locke, Pur-
nell, Boren, Laney & Neely, Dallas, Texas.
*** A.B., Duke University; J.D., Emory School of Law. Attorney at Law, Jackson,
Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
1. 102 S. Ct. 2613, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1982).
2. Id. at 2622, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 260. The Court struck down MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 278,
§ 16A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1923).
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Massachusetts, on behalf of the alleged victims, waived any right of the
state or the victims to exclude the press from the trial. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court construed the statute as requiring closure only
during the testimony of the minor victims, and left further closure to the
trial court's sound discretion. 3 The United States Supreme Court vacated
the Massachusetts court's opinion and remanded the case4 for reconsidera-
tion in light of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth .5
On remand the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed its prior opinion and
distinguished Richmond Newspapers on the ground that cases involving sex
offenses against minors constitute an exception to the open trial provision.6
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the mandatory
closure rule in section 16A violated the first amendment. 7 The Court
adopted the following test for closures of the type at issue in the case:
"Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right of ac-
cess in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental inter-
est, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
In Texas the court of criminal appeals examined the right of public ac-
cess to a criminal proceeding in Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
Shaver.9 In that case Antonio Nathaniel Bonham, on trial for capital mur-
3. 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360, 370-71 (1980).
4. 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
5. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond Newspapers the Supreme Court recognized for
the first time that the first amendment guarantees a right of public access to criminal trials.
Id at 580. At a fourth trial on murder charges, the court closed the trial to the public on the
defendant's motion. A newspaper and two reporters sought to vacate the order, arguing that
the court should ascertain whether the defendant's rights could adequately be protected in
any other way before ordering closure. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, and the
Virginia Supreme Court dismissed petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The
United States Supreme Court reversed. Id at 581. In a plurality opinion Justice Burger
stated that the public had a right under the first and fourteenth amendments to attend crimi-
nal trials. Id at 580. This right of attendance could be outweighed by overriding interests
as articulated by the trial court. As to closure in this case, however, no findings were made
concerning whether closure was a necessary step to protect these other interests. Id at 580-
81.
6. 423 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Mass. 1981).
7. 102 S. Ct. at 2622, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 260. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
stated that "to the extent that the first amendment embraced a right of access to criminal
trials, it is to ensure that the constitutionally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is
an informed one." Id. at 2619, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 256. The Court also found that the first
amendment properly affords protection to the right of access to criminal trials in particular,
both because such trials have historically been open to the press and public and because
such right of access plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial
process and the government as a whole. Id at 2620, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 256. In a concurring
opinion Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court's opinion should not be interpreted as
extending beyond the right of access to criminal trials. Id. at 2623, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 260.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the weight of his-
torical practice evidenced a clear exception to the rule of public access in cases involving
sexual assaults on minors. Id. at 2623, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 262 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens dissented on procedural grounds, arguing that the Court had rendered an advi-
sory opinion. Id at 2627, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 267.
8. Id at 2620, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 257.
9. 630 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc). The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals had decided in 1980 that a district court habeas corpus proceeding could not be
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der, was accused of the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a Houston
teacher. The Houston Chronicle and Houston Post assigned reporters to
cover Bonham's trial. During trial the state sought to introduce Bonham's
written confession in accordance with a state statute' 0 and the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Denno. 1I The court dis-
missed the jury for the day, so that the court could conduct a hearing to
determine the voluntariness of the confession. During the hearing Bon-
ham's attorney expressed concern that the jurors might hear or read media
accounts of the proceedings. The court then conducted a closed hearing in
chambers. After the jury found Bonham guilty, the court released to re-
porters a transcript of the closed portion of the hearing. The newspapers
asserted rights under a Texas statute' 2 and two provisions of the Texas
Constitution.' 3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the stat-
ute carried constitutional implications and mandamus with a proper rem-
edy.' 4 The court concluded: "[W]e find that this respondent [the trial
judge] was not authorized effectively to close out the public and media
from the proceeding that our State Law commands shall be open. Article
1, §§ 8 and 10; Article 1.24."' 5 Thus, the court found an affirmative right
of public access to trials and proceedings constitutionally grounded in arti-
cle 1, sections 8 and 10 of the state constitution and statutorily provided for
in article 1.24.
The trial of United States v. Chagra16 generated several conflicts be-
tween the press and the court with respect to access to the criminal pro-
ceedings. Chagra and others were on trial for conspiring to murder United
States District Judge John Wood in San Antonio, Texas. In April 1982
three news organizations objected to an order of the United States Magis-
trate closing portions of a hearing on Joseph Chagra's motion for bail re-
duction. The court, relying on Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,17 ruled that
public dissemination of the information in the closed hearing would "in
conducted in a closed hearing. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McMaster, 598 S.W.2d
864, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The court found art. 1.24 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure required the proceeding to be open to the public. Id Additionally, the court
found that the trial court had no authority to hold any such hearing in this particular case
because of McManus's pending appeal in the United States Supreme Court on the merits of
his conviction. Id. at 867-68; see Babcock & Collins, Local Government Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 409, 410 (1981).
10. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6 (Vernon 1979).
I1. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson v. Denno the United States Supreme Court reversed
a denial of writ of habeas corpus and held that New York procedure violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment by submitting the question of a confession's volun-
tariness (on which conflicting evidence existed) directly to the jury along with the other
issues of a criminal case. The Court found that due process entitled the defendant to an
evidentiary hearing resolving the conflicting factual assertions about the confession, as well
as the confession's voluntariness. Id. at 395-96.
12. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.24 (Vernon 1977) provides, "The proceedings
and trials in all courts shall be public." Id
13. TEX. CONST. art. 1, §§ 8, 10.
14. 630 S.W.2d at 933-34.
15. Id.
16. 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 102, 74 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1983).
17. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
1983]
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reasonable likelihood create a serious threat to the fair trial rights of de-
fendant Joseph Chagra and co-defendants." 18
Relying on local rule 500-2 of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, Judge Sessions prohibited any news reporters
from interviewing jurors after they had finished their deliberations with
respect to some of Chagra's co-defendants. Rule 500-2 provides that "no
person shall interview. . . any juror, relative, friend or associate. . . with
respect to the deliberations or verdict of the jury in any action, except on
leave of court granted upon good cause shown." 19 That rule was the sub-
ject of a first amendment attack and, after the survey period closed, the
Fifth Circuit declared it unconstitutional. 20
The United States Supreme Court continued its interest in the first
amendment right of access by granting review of the fourth such case in
five terms.21 In Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court22 a California trial
court closed voir dire in a rape-murder trial and denied access to a tran-
script of the voir dire. A California appeals court summarily denied the
newspaper's petition for a writ of mandate and the California Supreme
Court denied a request for a hearing. The United States Supreme Court
has granted a writ of certiorari. 23
B. The Texas Open Meetings Act
In Garcia v. City of Kingsville24 the plaintiff claimed that the city wrong-
fully dismissed him as Kingsville's city manager because his discharge was
conducted at a session held in violation of the Open Meetings Act. 25 The
Kingsville City Commission had convened and passed a final resolution
dismissing the plaintiff as city manager approximately fifty hours after no-
tice of the meeting was posted. After Garcia filed suit, the defendants, the
mayor of Kingsville and two commissioners, filed a motion for summary
18. Unreported opinion at 3 (SA-82-CR-57) (May 4, 1982).
19. TEX. (W.D.) LOCAL R. 500-2.
20. In re The Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1983). In In re The Express-
News Corp. a newspaper and its reporter filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the
Fifth Circuit following the federal district court's refusal to allow the newspaper to interview
members of a jury after the conclusion of a criminal trial. The Federal Court for the West-
ern District of Texas had applied its local rule 500-2. The Fifth Circuit recognized that
counterveiling circumstances in some cases may justify a restriction on the journalist's first
amendment rights to gather news. Id. at 809. The application of any such restriction, how-
ever, must be "narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the administration of
justice .... Neither the district court's rule nor its order applying the rule have been so
fashioned." Id at 810 (citation omitted). As to the requirement of rule 500-2 that the party
seeking the interview show good cause, the court stated: "[T]he first amendment right to
gather news is 'good cause' enough. If that right is to be restricted, the Government must
carry the burden of demonstrating the need for curtailment." Id
21. Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1983) (No. 82-556). The other cases decided in this area include Globe Newspaper v. Supe-
rior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 72 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1982), Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
22. 51 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-556).
23. Id.
24. 641 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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judgment, contending that the meeting was an emergency meeting, duly
noted, and that the Act required only two hours advance notice. 26 The
defendants further contended that their determination that an emergency
existed was not subject to judicial review. The defendants' motion for
summary judgment was granted, and an appeal followed.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals noted that compliance with the
Open Meetings Act is mandatory and that any action taken by a govern-
mental body in violation of the statute is subject to judicial reversal in a
suit brought by a person the action has adversely affected.27 The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the commission's determination of
an emergency was not subject to judicial review. 28 The court also rejected
the defendant's contention that the emergency designation had been estab-
lished as a matter of law and consequently reversed the case and remanded
it for trial.29
In University Interscholastic League v. Payne30 the parents and team-
mates of two football players, whom the University Interscholastic League
(UIL) has declared ineligible, brought suit against the UIL after the decla-
ration of ineligibility forced the players' schools to forfeit all games in
which the two players had participated. After the trial court temporarily
enjoined enforcement of the UIL's decision, the UIL gave notice of appeal.
The UIL failed, however, to file the requisite appeal bond.31 Finding no
exception exempting the UIL from providing the bond, the court of ap-
peals held that the appeal was not properly perfected and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. 32 In a dictum the court noted that the UIL
District Executive Committee's meeting in which the two athletes had been
declared ineligible was not held in compliance with the Texas Open Meet-
ings Act. 33 The court, however, reserved the question of whether the UIL
is subject to the Open Meetings Act. 34
26. The defendants were attempting to fall within that part of art. 6252-17, § 3A(h)
that provides: "In case of emergency or urgent public necessity, which shall be expressed in
the notice, it shall be sufficient if the notice is posted two hours before the meeting is con-
vened." Id § 3A(h).
27. 641 S.W.2d at 341.
28. Id The court cited Cameron County Good Gov't League v. Ramon, 619 S.W.2d
224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the Cameron County Com-
missioners Court contended that their determination of the necessity of an "emergency"
meeting was not subject to judicial review. Id at 230. In Ramon the commissioners had
held many meetings under the "emergency or urgent public necessity" exception to the stat-
utory 72-hour notice requirement. In rejecting the commissioners' contention that their de-
cision was not subject to judicial review, the Ramon court stated that "to contend that a
governing body has unbridled power to decide what is an emergency under the Open Meet-
ing Act flies in the teeth of Section 3 (1970) which specifically allows judicial review 'for the
purpose of stopping or preventing violations or threatened violations of this Act.'" Id. at
231.
29. 641 S.W.2d at 342.
30. 635 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ dism'd).
31. The appellant had failed to satisfy the requisites of TEx. R. Civ. P. 354.
32. 635 S.W.2d at 756-57.
33. Id at 758.
34. Id at 758 n.6.
19831
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C Texas Open Records Act
Only one case construed the Texas Open Records Act 35 during the sur-
vey period. In Austin v. City of San Antonio36 the San Antonio Urban
Renewal Agency received a request for information concerning the
amount of the agency's initial offer to landowners in twenty-one condem-
nation cases. The agency refused the request on the ground that the infor-
mation was exempt from disclosure under the Act because it constituted
settlement negotiations and interagency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters.37 The petitioner argued that the agency's failure to request a deci-
sion from the attorney general as to whether the information requested
was exempt from disclosure gave rise to an irrebuttable presumption that
the information sought was not exempt and hence should be released as a
matter of law. 38 The agency did not request an attorney general's ruling on
the ground that existing attorney generals' opinions and judicial decisions
on similar subjects supported the agency's determination concerning the
confidentiality of settlement negotiations. The court found it unnecessary
to reach the question of the necessity of an attorney general's ruling be-
cause it found the statutory exceptions the agency had invoked "plainly
inapplicable to the information withheld. ' 39 The court ordered the infor-
mation disclosed.4°
35. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
36. 630 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
37. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(1), (11) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983).
38. See id § 7(a). The statute provides:
If a governmental body receives a written request for information which it
considers within one of the exceptions stated in Section 3 of this Act, but there
has been no previous determination that it falls within one of the exceptions,
the governmental body within a reasonable time, no later than ten days, after
receiving a written request must request a decision from the attorney general
to determine whether the information is within that exception. If a decision is
not so requested, the information shall be presumed to be public information.
Id
39. 630 S.W.2d at 393.
40. Id. at 394. Several law review articles written during the survey period considered
access issues. See BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight- Some Reflections on Richmond
Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311 (1982); Robinson, Media Access to Video Tape Evi-
dence in Criminal Trials, 4 CoMM/ENT L.J. 345 (1982); Schmitt & Schmitt, Some Observa-
tions on the Swinging Courthouse Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 59 DEN.
L.J. 721 (1982); Comment, Developments Under the Freedom ofInformation Act-1981, 1982
DUKE L.J. 423; Note, Common Law Right of Access to Judicial Records-Criminal Defend-
ant's Right to a Fair Trial-United States v. Myers, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843; Note, Evaluating
Court Closures After Richmond Newspapers: Using Sixth Amendment Standards to Enforce
a First Amendment Right, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 304 (1982); Note, The Applicability of the
Freedom of Information Act's Disclosure Requirements to Intellectual Property, 57 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 561 (1982); Note, Legislation.- Sunshine in the Sunshine Belt.: Oklahoma's New
Open Meetings Act, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 362 (1981); Note, Chandler v. Florida: Cameras,
Courts, and the Constitution, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 165 (1981).
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D. Attorney General Opinions Concerning the Texas Open Records Act 41
In ORD-283 42 the attorney general addressed the availability of a Dallas
Park Police file to the person who is the subject of the file. The City of
Dallas objected to disclosing: (1) criminal history information regarding
the requester and members of her family; and (2) responses of her refer-
ences and former employers to a questionnaire from the Parks Depart-
ment. The attorney general upheld the claimed exemption under section
3(a)(1) of the Texas Open Records Act 43 with respect to the first type of
information." With respect to the second category of information the at-
torney general ruled the information was public and not subject to exemp-
tion under section 3(a)(l 1), and further found that the requester could not
waive the public's right to the information even though she may have
waived her own rights.45
In ORD-284 46 the attorney general considered the availability to the
public of a high school principal's personnel file and an audit report con-
cerning financial irregularities. The attorney general held that disclosure
of the information was proper with limited exceptions. 47 Letters of recom-
mendation in the principal's personnel file, written prior to the June 14,
1973, effective date of the Open Records Act and made pursuant to
promises of confidentiality, were exempt from disclosure.48 The attorney
general noted this exception avoided the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of the obligation of contracts. The attorney general further
excepted from disclosure portions of the employee's evaluations by super-
visors as well as recommendations for reemployment.
49
In ORD-285 50 the attorney general determined the availability of inves-
tigative reports concerning misconduct in a city tax office. The attorney
general found synopses of witnesses' interviews exempt from disclosure
under section 3(a)(1) of the Open Records Act. 5' The allegations and por-
tions of the actual report were not exempt from disclosure; the exemption
did apply, however, to the investigator's opinions and recommendations.
52
ORD-286 53 involved the availability of records maintained by a city fire
marshall. The records at issue consisted of a fire investigation report, in-
cluding an offense report detailing the original incident, a supplementary
offense report, and a witness's voluntary statement. The fire marshall
41. The attorney general issues opinions as to the applicability of the Open Records Act
to a particular situation. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7(a) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983); see supra note 38.
42. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-283 (1981).
43. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(I) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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claimed exemption from disclosure of the records under section 3(a)(8)54
as records of law enforcement agencies dealing with the detection and in-
vestigation of crime. The attorney general held that the fire marshall had
properly withheld information since the district attorney had not made a
decision concerning the initiation of prosecution. 5
In ORD-28756 the attorney general was asked to determine whether
records of community service divisions of police departments were exempt
from disclosure. The requester sought information kept by the Commu-
nity Services Division of the Dallas Police Department concerning the
name and address of the person referred to, comments about her, the name
of the social worker assigned to the matter, and the date of the entry of the
notation. Finding that the information sought dealt directly with the activ-
ity of the Community Services Division of the Dallas Police Department
and not with crime detection, the attorney general rejected the police de-
partment's claim of exemption under section 3(a)(8). 7 An objection under
section 3(a)( 1),5 8 the interagency memorandum exemption, was upheld,
however, inasmuch as the private agency that distributed the information
to the Dallas Police Department's Community Services Division was oper-
ating pursuant to a contract with the Texas Department of Human Re-
sources, the agency responsible for the administration of public welfare
programs in Texas.5 9
ORD-28860 dealt with the availability of a report concerning a former
high school principal to the current principal under the Open Records Act.
The report dealt with the results of an investigation into the manner in
which all the district's high school principals handled various revenues en-
trusted to them and discussed the principal's overall performance. The
attorney general's decision turned on whether section 3(a)(2) of the Act6 I
provided a special right of access overriding other exemptions under the
Act. The attorney general in ORD-20062 took the position that section
3(a)(2) did provide to employees a special right of access entitling them to
54. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) pro-
vides an exemption for "records of law enforcement agencies that deal with the detection
and investigation of crime and the internal records and notations of such law enforcement
agencies which are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement."
55. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-286 (1981).
56. Id ORD-287.
57. Id; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983).
58. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(l 1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
provides an exemption for "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than one in litigation with the agency."
59. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. ORD-287 (1981).
60. Id. ORD-288.
61. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) pro-
vides an exemption for
information in personnel files, the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; provided, however, that all
information in personnel files of an individual employee within a governmen-
tal body is to be made available to that individual employee or his designated
representative as is public information under this Act.
62. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-200 (1978).
[Vol. 37
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personnel information otherwise exempted from disclosure.63 The attor-
ney general stated in ORD-288, however, that "we are no longer prepared
to accept the view that the 3(a)(2) proviso overrides the 3(a)(3) exemption.
3(a)(3) prevents governmental entities from possibly having to compromise
their position in pending or anticipated litigation or in settlement negotia-
tions by having to divulge information relating thereto." 64 Thus, the attor-
ney general overruled ORD-200 to the extent that it could be read to
permit section 3(a)(2) to override the section 3(a)(3) exemption. 65
In ORD-290 66 the attorney general considered whether the public
should have access to psychologists' licensing files. The request specifically
asked for documents involving complaints, charges, and actions taken in
disciplinary hearings involving licensees of the Texas State Board of Ex-
aminers of Psychologists. A Texas statute, article 4512c, section 23(e), pro-
vides that "[a]ll charges, complaints, notices, orders, records, and
publications authorized or required by the terms of this Act shall be privi-
leged."'67 The board of examiners argued that the term "privileged" con-
tained in the Act made records confidential by law and, therefore, exempt
under section 3(a)(1). The attorney general found that the exemption did
not apply and stated: "We must conclude that, whatever the legislature
intended the term 'privilege' to mean, it did not intend that it should be
construed to mean 'confidential.' "68
In ORD-29269 the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) was asked
for a copy of a contract in its possession between the TexIand Electric Co-
operative and the Shell Oil Company. Shell had agreed to provide the
LCRA with the contract only upon an express promise of confidentiality.
The attorney general ruled the information exempt from disclosure, rely-
ing on the exemption contained in section 3(a)(1)70 as well as the case of
National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton .7
63. Id
64. Id ORD-288 (1981); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983) provides an exemption for
information relating to litigation of a criminal or civil nature and settlement
negotiations, to which the state or political subdivision is, or may be, a party,
or to which an officer or employee of the state or political subdivision, as a
consequence of his office or employment, is or may be a party, that the attor-
ney general or the respective attorneys of the various political subdivisions has
determined should be withheld from public inspection.
65. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. ORD-288 (1981).
66. Id ORD-290.
67. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512c, § 23(e) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
68. TEX. Arr'v GEN. ORD-290 (1981).
69. Id ORD-292.
70. Id
71. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In National Parks the plaintiff sought to inspect and
copy certain agency records pertaining to the National Park Service's concession operations.
The Department of the Interior refused, and the plaintiff brought suit under the Freedom of
Information Act. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the basis of a commercial or financial information exemption. Id at 766. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded, formulating a standard by which the confidentiality of
commercial or financial information is to be judged:
[C]ommerical or financial matter is 'confidential' for purposes of the exemp-
19831
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In ORD-2947 2 the University of Texas was asked to provide copies of all
wire, cable, and teletype traffic between the International Office of the
University and the Government of Bahrain. The attorney general over-
ruled the university's claim that the doctrine of sovereign immunity pro-
tected the information. 73 Instead, the attorney general ruled that the
information should be released with an exception; information relating to
student records that, while not identifying individual students by name,
related only to a small number of students could not be released.74 Since,
in a small sampling, identification of individuals may be a relatively sim-
ple task, the exemption contained in section 3(a)(14) was applicable.75
In ORD-29576 the requester sought a draft plan that the Division of
Special Studies and System Planning of the Texas Parks and Wildlife De-
partment had prepared concerning Matagora Island and submitted to the
executive director of that department. The director refused to disclose the
study to the requester. The attorney general upheld the director's claimed
exemption under section 3(a)(l 1),77 ruling that the small amount of factual
information disclosable in the report was so intertwined with the exempted
opinions and recommendations that it was not reasonably severable. 78
In ORD-29679 the two newspaper reporters asked for certain informa-
tion in the possession of the Dallas Environmental Health and Conserva-
tion Department concerning lead pollution or poisoning in the city, as well
as certain information the R.S.R. Corporation had sent to the city. The
attorney general held that the city could withhold information that tends
to identify those making complaints to the city concerning lead pollution
or poisoning.80 The city further sought to withhold information based on
trade secrets claimed by R.S.R. The attorney general held that the infor-
mation sought did, indeed, contain trade secrets and should, therefore, be
withheld.8 '
In ORD-3008 2 the requester sought a list of all corporations filing
tion if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the following
effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information
in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained.
Id. at 770. The court remanded to allow the concessionaires to show that the Park Service's
disclosure of the information would result in injury to them. Id at 770-71.
72. TEX. ATr'y GEN. ORD-294 (1981).
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(14) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
provides an exemption for "student records at educational institutions funded wholly, or in
part, by state revenue; but such records shall be made available upon request of educational
institution personnel, the student involved, or that student's parent, legal guardian, or
spouse."
76. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. ORD-295 (1981).
77. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(l 1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(interagency and intra-agency memorandum exemption); see supra note 39.
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franchise tax returns under the county-assessed-value method of taxation
from the Comptroller of Public Accounts. The attorney general held that
the information was not public, but was exempt from disclosure under sec-
tion 3(a)(1) because a Texas statute provided that "all information secured,
derived, or obtained from any record, instrument or copy thereof required
to be furnished under the terms of this Chapter shall be and shall remain
confidential and not open to public inspection. '83
II. ZONING
A. Adult Theaters
In Basiardanes v. City of Galveston8 4 the Fifth Circuit, reversing the
United States District Court,85 struck down as violative of the first amend-
ment a City of Galveston zoning ordinance that restricted the operation of
adult theaters to certain defined areas. Basiardanes leased a building he
owned for the showing of adult films. Shortly thereafter, Glaveston passed
a zoning ordinance that clearly prohibited use of his building for such a
purpose.86 The ordinance keyed its definition of adult motion picture the-
aters to Texas law, which provides that an adult theater is one "from
which, under the laws of the State of Texas, minors are excluded by virtue
of age unless accompanied by a consenting parent, guardian or spouse. '87
The definition in the ordinance, however, was not limited to theaters show-
ing obscene or blatantly sexual movies. The ordinance restricted adult
theaters to three zoning districts. Within those areas the ordinance re-
quired dispersal of adult theaters in such a way that they were excluded
from eighty to ninety percent of the areas in which they were not totally
banned.88 The remaining areas where they could be located were econom-
ically and physically unsuitable.89 The ordinance also regulated any ad-
83. Cigarette, franchise, sales, and tobacco taxes--confidentiality of information, ch.
740, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 740, § 3, at 1822-23, repealed by Title 2, Tax Code, 1981
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 389, § 39(a), at 1785. Under the new code, the relevant confidentiality
provisions can be found at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.206 (Vernon 1982).
84. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
85. 514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981). The district court found that the plaintiff lacked
standing under certain provisions of the ordinance, id. at 977-79, and upheld the ordinance
against both first and fourteenth amendment challenges. Id at 981-83.
86. For the text of the Galveston ordinance, see Appendix "A" of the district court's
opinion. Id. at 983-85.
87. Id. at 984. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.24 (Vernon 1974) deals with the sale, dis-
tribution, or display of harmful material to a minor and provides that a person commits an
offense under this section if he knowingly exhibits "harmful" material to a person under the
age of 17 years. Material is "harmful" if its "dominant theme taken as a whole: (A) appeals
to the prurient interest of a minor, in sex, nudity, or excretion; (B) is patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for
minors; and (C) is utterly without redeeming social value for minors." For a recent discus-
sion of obscenity laws in Texas, see Comment, Changing Standards of Obscenity in Texas, 34
Sw. L.J. 1201 (1981).
88. Adult theaters were essentially limited to areas zoned for light and heavy industry,
as the dispersal requirements effectively banned their location within the central business
district.
89. 682 F.2d at 1209.
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vertising or displays for adult book stores or theaters that were visible to
the public from any street, sidewalk, or public place.90 The court held that
Basiardanes had no standing to challenge the ordinance for vagueness, 9'
but because he suffered out-of-pocket injuries, he did have standing to
challenge its location restrictions. 92 Basiardanes maintained that the zon-
ing restriction was "tantamount to a total ban of additional adult theaters
in Galveston in breach of the First Amendment. ' 93 While recognizing that
a zoning regulation will generally be sustained if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest and does not extinguish all practicable uses of the
property, 94 the court noted that different judicial attitudes come into play
when zoning schemes intrude upon activity the first amendment protects.95
The court found that Galveston had not limited application of its ordi-
nance to theaters peddling obscene materials, which are outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment. Instead, the city attempted to regulate, to the
point of banning, theaters regularly showing any film that under Texas law
could not be viewed by minors unaccompanied by an adult.96 The court
rejected Galveston's argument that the ordinance was merely a time, place,
and manner of operation regulation of adult theaters on the ground that
the ordinance substantially excluded adult theaters from the city.9 7 The
court concluded that the Galveston ordinance was "neither motivated by a
sufficient governmental interest, nor narrowly tailored so as to satisfy the
First Amendment."9 Galveston had claimed a legitimate governmental
interest based on the nexus between crime and adult theaters. The court
found, however, that this purported nexus was based solely on the specula-
tion of city officials and was not supported in the record. 99 In addition, the
city stated that the ordinance was necessary to further its goal of upgrading
the downtown area. 1°° The court concluded, however, that the ordinance
90. The court noted that "no other commercial establishments were similarly regu-
lated." Id
91. Id at 1210-11. The court found that Basiardanes had no standing to challenge the
statute as vague, either as himself, as a third party, or as a moviegoer. Id
92. Id. at 1212 n.6.
93. Id at 1212.
94. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980) (city zoning ordinance
upheld as not in violation of fifth amendment); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,
5 (1974) (zoning ordinances upheld if reasonable and not arbitrary); Stansberry v. Holmes,
613 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir. 1980) (proper standard of review is whether zoning ordinance
is "arbitrary and capricious").
95. 682 F.2d at 1212 (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)).
96. 682 F.2d at 1212-13.
97. Id at 1213-14. A time, place, or manner regulation would be sustained against first
amendment challenge even though it restricted free speech, if it left open adequate channels
of communication. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972). In reaching its
conclusion the court distinguished Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976), on which Galveston relied to show it had left open alternative channels of
communication.
98. 682 F.2d at 1215.
99. Id.
100. The court found that this was a proper legislative goal, stating that the "rehabilita-
tion of blighted urban areas and the use of zoning to accomplish urban renewal are legiti-
mate goals for a city." Id
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was far more restrictive than necessary to achieve this goal, and therefore,
violated the first amendment.' 0 ' The advertising ban was similarly re-
jected. Despite evidence of a "strong and legitimate" city interest in
shielding its citizens from lurid film advertisements, the court held that the
absolute proscription of advertising by adult theaters could not be
sustained. ' 0 2
B. Mobile Homes
The Texas Supreme Court upheld the regulation of mobile homes as a
valid exercise of a municipality's police power in City of Brookside Village
v. Comeau103 Pursuant to two ordinances of the city's Mobile Home
Code,'0° the city council denied the Comeaus' application to place a mo-
bile home on their four-acre lot for use as a residence. The Comeaus
brought an action against the city contending that the ordinances imposed
an arbitrary restriction on property use not related to proper municipal
objectives, and hence represented an unconstitutional exercise of police
power. They also claimed that the ordinances were invalid as attempts to
regulate in an area preempted by state and federal law. '0 5 The court listed
several factors justifying location regulation of mobile homes, including
greater facility for police and fire protection and for provision of necessary
services such as water, sewer, and lighting. Additionally, the court noted
that encouragement of the most appropriate use of land and conservation
of property values likewise warranted the regulation, particularly in view
of the transient nature of mobile homes and the impact of their random
placement on property values.1°6 Noting that while recent significant
changes in the design and construction of mobile homes might justify
treatment consistent with that afforded conventional housing, the court de-
termined that the issue was better left to legislative consideration. 0 7 The
Comeaus' preemption argument was based on the National Manufactured
Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974,108 and the Texas
Manufactured Housing Standards Act. 109 The court found that the Brook-
side Village location ordinances did not conflict with these federal and
101. Id. at 1216-17.
102. Id at 1219.
103. 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982).
104. The two ordinances regulated the operation and maintenance of mobile home parks
and prohibited the placement of mobile homes used as residences outside of such parks. Id
at 792 n.2.
105. Id at 792.
106. Id at 794.
107. Id at 795. The court deferred to the legislature in view of the constantly changing
conditions of urban development and the "judicial acknowledgment of zoning power." Id;
see also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (state legislature and city council decision
should not be disturbed unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
109. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522 If (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). In recognition of
the various problems related to the manufactured home industry, the Texas legislature felt
that the expansion of "various regulatory powers to deal with these problems" was "the most
economical and efficient means of dealing with this problem and serving the public interest."
Id art. 5221, § 2.
1983]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
state regulations and, as such, were not preempted." 0
C Spot Zoning
Spot zoning occurs when an amendatory ordinance treats a small tract
of land differently from similar surrounding land without proof of changed
condition. Such zoning is uniformly prohibited when it has a substantial
adverse impact upon the surrounding land."'I In City of Texarkana v.
Howard 212 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that an
ordinance amending the city's comprehensive zoning plan was invalid as
unjustifiable spot zoning. 1 3 In Howard the city annexed certain tracts of
land in 1972 into an agricultural zoning district that restricted residential
use to single family residences on at least one acre. In 1979 the city
adopted an ordinance amending zoning for the annexed tract to allow for
construction of an apartment complex. In analyzing the surrounding land-
holders' spot zoning claim, the court considered the guidelines the Texas
Supreme Court supplied in City ofPharr v. T'pitt.114 The court first noted
that although the tract in issue comprised 5.98 acres, it was still considered
small in relation to neighboring affected lands that included substantially
larger tracts.11 5 The court also found no evidence of substantially changed
conditions in the rezoned area to justify the special zoning."*6 Finally, the
court looked to the factors laid out in Tppitt and considered the extent of
any adverse impact upn neighboring lands, the suitability of the tract for
use in accordance with present zoning, and the effect of the amendatory
ordinance on public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The court
found that the adverse impact of an apartment complex on neighboring
lands would be substantial, that the annexed land was perfectly suited for
use in accordance with present zoning, and that the evidence failed to
show any benefit to the community from the rezoning.
1 7
110. 633 S.W.2d at 796.
111. See City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 179 (Tex. 1981) (Texas Supreme Court
sustained a municipal zoning ordinance against claims that it constituted spot zoning); see
also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 101 Ic (Vernon 1963) (requiring zoning regulations to
"be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan").
112. 633 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ re'f n.r.e.).
113. Id. at 598.
114. 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981).
115. 633 S.W.2d at 597. The contiguous tracts of land ranged in size from one to twenty
acres. Id.
116. Id. ;see Thompson v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1974) (rezoning of
4.1-acre tract for commercial use in a residential area not justified by changes such as street
widening, commercial lighting installation, and traffic increase); Hunt v. City of San
Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1971) (change from one permitted use to another per-
mitted use did not constitute material change of conditions to justify rezoning); Weaver v.
Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 317-18, 232 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1950) (arbitrary change of zoning from
single family residence to apartment house zone destroyed presumption that amendatory
ordinance was valid).
117. 633 S.W.2d at 598.
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D. Joint Zoning and Planning Commissions
In Lacy v. Hoff" 18 the Houston [14th District] court of appeals reversed
the district court's granting of a mandatory injunction that compelled the
planning and zoning commission to approve the landowner-plaintiffs sub-
division and issue him a building permit." 9 The commission had denied
the plaintiffs submitted lot and construction plan because it conflicted
with the city's planning and zoning ordinance. 20 The plaintiff success-
fully appealed to the board of adjustment for a variance to the ordinance,
but approval of his plat was again denied when he returned to the plan-
ning and zoning commission. The trial court ordered the commission to
approve the plan because of the board of adjustment's variance decision.
The court of appeals reversed, noting that although statutorily one body
may serve in a dual capacity as both a planning commission and a zoning
commission,' 2' the duties and functions of the two are distinct.' 22 A zon-
ing commission has no ultimate authority; article 101 f authorizes it to act
solely in an advisory capacity to the city council in zoning matters. 123 Ar-
ticle 101 lg' 24 empowers a board of adjustment, a quasi-judicial body, to
authorize variances consistent with the public interest when literal enforce-
ment of an ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship. 25 A planning
commission, on the other hand, has the general duty of enforcing the plat-
ting requirements of article 974a by "refusing to endorse approval on any
plat which does not satisfy the minimum requirements of 974a, and the
rules and regulations adopted by the City Council governing plats and the
subdivision of land."' 126 City ordinances require approval by the planning
commission and proper recordation of a plat before a building permit can
issue.' 27 The court held that any ordinance that subjected the platting and
subdividing responsibilities of a planning commission to a review decision
of a board of adjustment was void 128 since a board has no appellate juris-
diction over a planning commission's subdivision plat approval process. 129
118. 633 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ dism'd).
119. Id. at 611.
120. Because the plats did not comply with the statutory requirements of TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 974a (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1982-1983), regulating subdivision develop-
ment, the court held they could not be recorded. 633 S.W.2d at 611.
121. 633 S.W.2d at 607. TEX. REV. CIv, STAT. ANN. art. 1011f(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983), authorizing the appointment of a zoning commission, states that "[wihere a City Plan
Commission already exists, it may be appointed as the Zoning Commission."
122. 633 S.W.2d at 606.
123. Id. at 607. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 101 If(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) pro-
vides that the zoning commission shall "recommend" various zoining regulations.
124. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1011 g(g) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (setting out
powers of board of adjustment).
125. 633 S.W.2d at 607.
126. Id. at 608.
127. Id
128. Id. at 609.
129. Id at 610.
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E Enforcement
In Marriott v. City of Dallas130 the city succeeded in obtaining a perma-
nent injunction to prevent Marriott from excavating further without the
special permit required by a zoning ordinance. The landowner appealed,
arguing that the city was estopped from enforcing the injunction on the
basis of a city inspector's report, which followed personal inspection of the
excavated property. The report indicated that Marriott had not violated
the zoning ordinance. The court of appeals, however, rejected this argu-
ment and held that the city was neither bound by the reports, nor estopped
to deny the inspector's conclusions. 31 The court reasoned that inasmuch
as the city discharges a governmental function in enforcing its zoning ordi-
nances, the equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches are not available
against it.132
F School Districts
In City of Addison v. Dallas Independent School District133 the Dallas
court of appeals held that "the zoning authority of a municipality is sub-
servient to the reasonable exercise of school district authority."' 34 The
Dallas Independent School District had proposed to use certain Addison
property it owned as a bus parking facility. The city of Addison brought
suit against the school district, contending that because the land in ques-
tion was zoned residential, the use of the property to park buses violated its
zoning ordinance. During the litigation Addison also passed a nuisance
ordinance applicable to the creation of the bus facility. The court of ap-
peals upheld the district court's decision to enjoin enforcement of the zon-
ing and nuisance ordinances against the school district. 35 In doing so, the
court rejected the city's narrow interpretation of Austin Independent School
District v. City of Sunset Valley.' 36 The city of Addison argued that Sunset
Valley applies only when a municipality totally prohibits a school district
from constructing facilities within the city's boundaries. 37 Instead, the
court interpreted Sunset Valley as establishing that a "school district's au-
thority to locate school facilities overrides the police power of municipali-
ties to zone them out in order that the legislative purpose in delegating this
authority to the school district might not be frustrated."'' 38 As to the nui-
sance ordinance, 139 the court determined that the authorized acts of a
130. 635 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
131. Id at 564.
132. Id.
133. 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. Id at 772.
135. Id at 774.
136. 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973). The Texas Supreme Court in Sunset Valley held that a
city, through its zoning power, can not "wholly exclude from within its boundaries school
facilities reasonably located." Id. at 672.
137. 632 S.W.2d at 772.
138. Id at 773.
139. The city of Addison contended that the overnight parking of buses and trucks in an
area zoned residential constituted a nuisance in violation of this ordinance. Id
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school district can neither be nuisances per se nor be declared nuisances by
the city.140 Nuisance will only be actionable when it "is established by
evidence that the governmental function is conducted in an unreasonble
manner."' 41 According to the court, inasmuch as the jury had determined
that the bus facility had not become a nuisance by reason of its locality,
surroundings, or manner in which it was conducted, further inquiry was
foreclosed. ' 42
G. Oil Wells
In Unger v. State 43 the Fort Worth court of appeals upheld the author-
ity of a city acting under its police power to both regulate and prohibit the
drilling of oil wells within city limits. 44 The court held that the legislative
delegation to the railroad commission of the right to regulate the oil and
gas business in Texas did not in any way conflict with municipal authority
also to regulate in that area for legitimate purposes. 145
III. CONDEMNATION
A. Zoning Conflicts
The Texas Supreme Court addressed only one condemnation case wor-
thy of note during the survey period. In City of Lubbock v. Austin 146 con-
demnation of part of a residential lot for street widening left the lot with
less than the minimum width required by zoning ordinances. The Austins
defended the condemnation action by contending that the city abused its
discretion in exercising its eminent domain power in derogation of one of
its zoning ordinances. 47 In determining whether a city was bound by its
zoning ordinances when exercising its power of eminent domain, the court
analogized to its previous decision in Austin Independent School District v.
City of Sunset Valley. 148 The court in Sunset Valley allowed the school
district to construct facilities in a location that violated city zoning ordi-
nances. Based on this decision the court in City of Lubbock held that in
140. Id
141. Id
142. Id at 774. Such a category of nuisance is not subject to municipal ordinance, but
rather requires a judicial determination that the activity has become a nuisance by virtue of
these various factors. Id at 773.
143. 629 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd).
144. Id at 812.
145. Id. at 813. The court cited Klepak v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 177 S.W.2d 215, 218
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which held that in delegating such au-
thority the legislature did not intend to "repeal the fundamental law" that a municipality
has the police power to regulate the drilling and production of oil "when acting for the
protection of their citizens and the property within their limits, looking to the preservation of
good government, peace, and order therein." Id (citations omitted).
146. 628 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1982).
147. The court expressly declined to decide whether the city would be estopped from
bringing any action against the Austins for violation of the zoning ordinance. It did, how-
ever, assume that this would be the case. Id at 49 n. I; see Black & Daniel, The Texas Rule
of Estoppel in Zoning Cases, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 241 (1981).
148. 502 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973); see supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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exercising its power of eminent domain, a city is not bound by its own
zoning ordinances absent a showing that the condemnation is unreasona-
ble or arbitrary.149 The court further determined that the question of the
reasonableness or arbitrariness of a proposed action is one of law to be
decided by the court.150
B. Procedure
In Peak Pipeline Corp. v. Norton 151 the Tyler court of appeals held that a
condemnor has an absolute right to proceed with its condemnation action,
despite the prior filing of a condemnee's wrongful trespass action. 52
Without permission of the landowners and without condemning the land
in question, Peak constructed a pipeline across Norton's property. Norton
filed suit for damages alleging wrongful trespass and Peak subsequently
brought a condemnation action. The trial court granted the condemnee's
plea in abatement because of the pending trespass action and dismissed the
condemnation suit. The court of appeals reversed, finding that as condem-
nation proceedings are purely statutory in nature, 153 the trial court was
without jurisdiction to interfere in any respect unless the condemnation
commission itself was without jurisdiction. 154 Norton argued that the rule
did not apply in his case because he, in essence, had filed an inverse con-
demnation action. The court rejected this argument, holding that it is the
absolute duty of the presiding district judge to appoint a special commis-
sion once a petition for condemnation has been filed, and that the court
thereafter lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the condemnation action under a
plea in abatement. 55
A related point was discussed in Matador Pipelines, Inc. v. Watson 156 in
149. 628 S.W.2d at 50. The court found this standard to be consistent with that used in
review of zoning changes. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text for survey period
cases dealing with this standard in the spot zoning context.
150. 628 S.W.2d at 50. In the trial court the jury found that the city had clearly abused
its discretion, but the trial judge disregarded these findings. The supreme court upheld that
trial court decision as one of law stating: "To hold otherwise would tend to substitute the
land use preferences of a jury for those of a governing body acting under statutory authority,
presumably with a special expertise in the area." Id.
151. 629 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
152. Id. at 187.
153. Id at 186. The law of condemnation in Texas is set out in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 3264-3271 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
154. 629 S.W.2d at 186; see, e.g., Tarrant County v. Shannon, 129 Tex. 264, 274, 104
S.W.2d 4, 9-10 (1937) (district court prohibited from issuing injunction to prevent county
from instituting valid condemnation proceedings for highway easement); Coastal Indus.
Water Auth. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 564 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ) (district court held to lack jurisdiction to enjoin condem-
nation proceedings validly instituted in county court, even though such proceedings began
after filing of suit for equitable relief); Trinity River Auth. v. Southland Paper Mills, Inc.,
448 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ) (condemnee held to have ade-
quate remedy in right of appeal from condemnation proceeding; granting of temporary in-
junction was therefore beyond jurisdiction of district court).
155. 629 S.W.2d at 187. The court suggested that once an appeal of the commission's
award has been made to the district court, the trial court could determine that the condem-
nation and trespass actions should be consolidated so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Id
156. 626 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Ct. App.-Waco 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
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which the Waco court of appeals upheld an award of actual and punitive
damages in a trespass action against a pipeline company. 57 The pipeline
company instituted condemnation proceedings, and the presiding judge
appointed three special commissioners in the cause. The hearing, how-
ever, was held by three different commissioners who heard the condemna-
tion action and made an award. 158  The appeals court held that
condemnation proceedings require strict adherence to statutory require-
ments for the protection of the landowner; thus the condemnation at bar
was void since it was heard not by the legally appointed commissioners,
but by three "interlopers." 59
C. Taking by Regulation
In National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Commodore Cove Improvement
District 160 the Fifth Circuit upheld, against due process and equal protec-
tion challenges, a waterfront subdivision regulation prohibiting the trans-
fer of lots lacking bulkheads. 16 1 The plaintiff was the owner of 133
residential waterfront lots when the Commodore Cove Improvement Dis-
trict adopted a regulation making it unlawful to build on or convey any
waterfront lot in the district lacking a bulkhead. 62 The purpose of the
regulation was "to protect the navigability of the State waters within [the]
District."'163 After complying with the requirements of the ordinance, the
plaintiff brought action seeking a declaratory judgment that the regulation
was unconstitutional, a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and
damages for the costs of installing the required bulkheads. The plaintiff
contended that the regulation was an unreasonable means of achieving its
stated end, and that the regulation effected a taking without just compen-
sation. The court initially rejected the plaintiffs argument that the right to
freely alienate real property was fundamental and called for strict scru-
tiny.164 Applying the rational basis standard of review instead, the court
found that the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden of proving the regula-
tion wholly arbitrary and totally without value in furthering a legitimate
governmental interest.165 The court recognized that the Commodore Cove
Improvement District could reasonably have concluded that the regulation
would promote the legitimate goal of aiding navigation. 66 As to the
157. Id. at 141. The company had built and put into operation a pipeline across Wat-
son's property.
158. Watson was not present at this hearing. Id.
159. Id at 140-41. The pipeline, therefore, had been built and put into operation in
violation of due process. This justified the plaintiffs damage award. Id. at 141.
160. 678 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1982).
161. Id. at 29.
162. Id. at 26 n.2.
163. Id. at 26. This stated purpose was included in the regulation itself. Id
164. Id. (citing Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149 n.6 (5th Cir.
1981)).
165. 678 F.2d at 27. National Western argued that regulation 3 was irrational because it
designated "the happening of a purely random event--the transfer of title to unbulkheaded
property-as a condition precedent for the installation of bulkheading." Id. at 26.
166. Id. at 27.
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plaintiffs argument that the regulation constituted a taking without just
compensation, the court found that the regulation did not diminish the
available use of the property and, indeed, the plaintiff used the property
for the very purpose for which it was intended. 167 The plaintiff, therefore,
had failed to show that the regulation was either confiscatory or inordi-
nately burdensome or that it denied economically viable use of the
property.168
Finally, the plaintiff claimed an equal protection violation in that the
ordinance burdened only one class of property owners, those who sought
to transfer title to their property. 69 Again applying the rational basis stan-
dard of review, the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of
establishing that the classification of property owners was wholly arbitrary
or did not "teleologically relate to a permissible government objective."' 70
D. Compensation A wards
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of proper calculation of compensa- -
tion awards in condemnation cases in United States v. 8.41 Acres of
Land.17' The Department of Energy filed a declaration of taking for a
pipeline easement on three adjacent tracts of land that adjoined an existing
pipeline corridor. At trial, witnesses for the parties testified as to different
methods of valuation resulting in dramatically different award recommen-
dations.' 72 The three-person condemnation commission based its award
on the landowners' rather unorthodox theory of easement valuation that
treated the easement as separate from the remaining acreage. 73 On this
basis the commission determined that the highest and best use of the con-
demned strip was for a pipeline right of way. The district court adopted
the commission's finding and based its award figure on comparable sales
of pipeline easements in the area. 74 On the government's appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's awards, holding that in federal
court, at least in the Fifth Circuit, 175 the appropriate measure of damages
in a partial taking case is the difference between the value after the taking;
167. Id at 28. The court also mentioned the district court's finding that the bulkheading
in fact increased the value of National Western's property. Id
168. Id Plaintiffs argument was characterized as baldly stating that the bulkheading
regulation effected a taking regardless of the magnitude of the burden it imposed on the
property owner. The court then dismissed that contention stating: "[T]hat argument does
not hold water." Id
169. Id at 29.
170. Id (citing Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1981)).
171. 680 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1982).
172. Id at 391. Government witnesses valued the easements at $38,395.00, while the
landowners' valuation witnesses estimated the easements' value to be $217,751.00.
173. Id at 392.
174. Id
175. The court specifically noted that the valuation method required in Texas differs
from that required in the Fifth Circuit. In Texas the award must include the fair market
value of the strip taken, plus damages for any decline in value of the surrounding land
caused by the severance or use to which the taken strip is put. See State v. Meyer, 403
S.W.2d 366, 371 (Tex. 1966); State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 610-11, 89 S.W.2d 194, 197(1936). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit requires the exclusive use of the before-and-
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that is, the difference between the market value of the land with and with-
out the property subject to the easement. 76 The court considered three
factors in rejecting the district court's finding that the condemned strip
constituted a separate parent tract because it had been severed from the
remaining acreage of each of the landowners. These factors included
physical contiguity, unity of ownership, and unity of use. 177 Applying a
clearly erroneous standard of review, the court determined that the con-
demned strip of land in each instance had an integrated use with the par-
ent tract, was physically contiguous therewith, and was subject to the same
ownership. 78 The court therefore concluded that the "before and after"
method of valuation was mandatory. 179 In addressing the issue of market
value, the court acknowledged a presumption in favor of the existing use,
which may be overcome only by a showing that at the time of the taking
the property was adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the near
future for another use.' 80 The landowners here failed to meet this burden
of proof,'8 ' in that the only evidence on point was the government wit-
nesses' testimony that the highest and best use was for industrial plant
sites.' 82 Accordingly, the court assessed the market value based on evi-
dence of five comparable sales of industrial property in the area at the time
of the taking. 183
IV. ANNEXATION
A. For Taxation Purposes Only
In Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur 184 the Superior Oil Company
challenged the validity of a sequential annexation ordinance of the city of
Port Arthur that resulted in annexation of an area extending three leagues
into the Gulf of Mexico and encompassing certain production facilities
and mineral leases the oil company owned. The court of appeals upheld
the ordinance against challenge that it was void because it was created
solely for the purpose of taxation and violated the due process clause of the
after valuation technique. See United States v. 158.24 Acres of Land, 515 F.2d 230, 232 (5th
Cir. 1975); Transwestem Pipeline Co. v. O'Brien, 418 F.2d 15, 21 (5th Cir. 1969).
176. 680 F.2d at 392.
177. Id. at 393.
178. Id at 393-94.
179. Id. at 394. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court so that the
commission could recompute an award based on this method. Id at 395.
180. Id. at 394-95.
181. Id at 395. The burden of proving the market value of the property taken by emi-
nent domain is on the landowner. United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266,
273 (1943).
182. 680 F.2d at 395. The court found no evidence that the highest and best use was for
a pipeline right-of-way; therefore, the commission's decision and the district court's adop-
tion of that decision based on this uncorroborated use was clearly erroneous. Id
183. Id The court held that the best evidence of market value was comparable sales.
See United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. 60.14
Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660, 665 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765,
775 (4th Cir. 1964); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 397 (1st Cir. 1944).
184. 628 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
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fourteenth amendment.1 85 The court cited a United States Supreme Court
decision, Hunter v. City of Pittsburg,186 for the proposition that annexation
of a territory by a political subdivision of a state does not present a justici-
able matter under the fourteenth amendment,187 and that the only remedy
for those aggrieved by annexation is in the state legislature. 8 8 In so con-
cluding, the court declined to consider the purposes behind the city's an-
nexation because determination of a municipality's boundaries is
ordinarily a political function vested entirely within the power of the state
legislature.189 The court noted that this proposition is true even when the
city provides no municipal services to the annexed territory. The sole rem-
edy for annexation without municipal services lies in statutory disannexa-
tion of such territory.' 90
The court then rejected an equal protection argument grounded on the
city's decision to annex the appellant's property rather than offer the com-
pany an industrial district contract.' 9' The court found that the city had
the power either to annex or to create an industrial district, and that absent
a showing that appellant was refused such a contract, it had no standing to
challenge the failure of the city to enter into such a contract. 92
B. Procedure
In San Diego Independent School District v. Central Education Agency 193
the Austin court of appeals considered the validity of the annexation by
the Freer Municipal Independent School District (FMISD) of territory
previously part of the San Diego Independent School District (SDISD).
185. Id. at 97. The ad valorem tax was the basis for the company's due process chal-
lenge. In upholding the tax the court distinguished between special taxes benefiting specific
property or persons within the district, see Myles Salt Co., Ltd. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239
U.S. 478, 485 (1916) (declaring such action unconstitutional), and ad valorem taxes that
benefit the entire community and are constitutionally sound. See State ex rel. Pan American
Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex. 450, 454, 303 S.W.2d 780, 783 (1957) ("constitutionality
sufficient if taxes are uniform and are for public purpose"), dism'dper curiam, 355 U.S. 603
(1958).
186. 207 U.S. 161, 174 (1907) (upholding Pennsylvania annexation statute, the Court
held that determination of municipal boundaries is a matter "peculiarly within the jurisdic-
tion of the State").
187. 628 S.W.2d at 96. The court cited various Texas annexation cases so holding. See,
e.g., City of Wichita Falls v. State ex rel. Vogtsberger, 533 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1976);
Carter v. Hamlin Hosp. Dist., 538 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977); City of Pasadena v. Houston Endowment, Inc.,
438 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Winship
v. City of Corpus Christi, 373 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1963, writ
ref d n.r.e.), dism'd wo.j, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 646 (1965).
188. 628 S.W.2d at 97.
189. Id
190. Id The statutory remedy of disannexation is set out in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 970a, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The court declined to speak on the recent amend-
ment of this article as it was not relevant to the case at bar. 628 S.W.2d at 97.
191. 628 S.W.2d at 98. The power of a city to enter into industrial contracts granting
limited immunity from annexation is given in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 5
(Vernon 1963).
192. 628 S.W.2d at 98.
193. 634 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
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The trial court had denied SDISD's request for a temporary injunction
against the annexation. SDISD asserted that the annexation was void be-
cause a majority vote of the SDISD trustees approving the annexation was
never obtained. The dispute centered around two provisions of the Texas
Education Code that provide for arguably inconsistent procedural prereq-
uisites for annexation of additional school district territory. 94 The court
found that because FMISD is a municipal school district, it is obliged to
follow only the requirements of section 19.164 of the Education Code,
which specifically addresses annexation by municipal school districts. 95
SDISD, however, based its action on the requirements of section 19.261,
which on its face is not limited in its application and which calls for a
majority of the district trustees to sign the petition as a prerequisite to an-
nexation.' 96 The court noted that independent school districts possess no
vested right in their territorial boundaries as originally established. 197 The
court then concluded that the appellant failed to meet its burden of dem-
onstrating a probable right to recover, and that the trial court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion in denying the temporary injunction. 98
V. TORT LIABILITY
Several important developments concerning the tort liability of local
governments resulted from decisions during the current survey period.
This section reviews decisions considering the Texas Tort Claims Act' 99
and the federal cause of action under section 1983 of title 4 2 .200
A. Texas Tort Claims Act
In Lorig v. City of Mission20' Lorig sued the city for damages to his
truck, claiming that the city's failure to clear branches and trees ob-
structing a stop sign caused the driver of his truck to run the stop sign and
collide with another vehicle. The Corpus Christi court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment for the city.20 2 The court stated that
keeping a stop sign unobstructed is a proprietary function of a municipal-
ity; Lorig's claim was barred because he had failed to give written notice of
his claim as the Mission City Charter required. 20 3 The supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals in a decision illustrating the fine lines that must
194. Id. at 51-52. The Texas statutes in issue were TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 19.164
(Vernon 1972), dealing with extension of boundaries and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 19.261
(Vernon 1972), dealing with detachment and annexation.
195. 634 S.W.2d at 52.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 52-53. The court cited State ex rel. Bloomingrove Indep. School Dist. v.
County Bd. of School Trustees, 334 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), which overruled the notion that such a vested right was integral to due process.
198. 634 S.W.2d at 53.
199. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
201. 629 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1982).
202. 626 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982).
203. Id. at 184.
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be drawn as a result of the still important governmental func-
tion/proprietary function distinction. 2°4 While expressing awareness that
Texas courts have held that the negligent erection or maintenance of traffic
signs warning of construction or improvements to streets involved a mu-
nicipality's proprietory function, the court ruled that maintenance of a stop
sign was entirely different and involved solely the governmental function
of traffic regulation. 20 5 The court held that Lorig's claim could be brought
under the Act because "[a] stop sign's obstruction from view by trees or
branches is a 'condition' of that sign within the meaning of article 6252-19,
section 14(12)."2 06 Reversing and remanding for trial on the merits, the
court noted that material issues of fact existed including whether Mission
had received actual notice of the injury pursuant to section 16 of the
Act.20
7
Two decisions from the courts of appeals struggled with section 14(7),208
which contains an important but difficult to construe discretionary act ex-
emption upon which local governments often have relied to excuse them
204. Proprietary function torts were cognizable against municipalities under Texas law
prior to the Tort Claims Act; the Act waived the previously existing immunity for torts based
upon performance of governmental functions but did not affect the law concerning proprie-
tary torts. The distinction remains important because the notice requirements under the Act
may be more lenient than those under court developed law relating to proprietary torts. See
Babcock & Collins, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 471,
498 n.219 (1982). For a recent decision distinguishing governmental and proprietary func-
tions, see Williams v. City of Dallas, 636 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ)
(operation of storm sewer system is proprietary function and therefore Tort Claims Act does
not apply; under common law liability for performance of proprietary functions, however,
instructed verdict for Dallas reversed because proof of absence of drain cover for four
months sufficient to create fact issue regarding Dallas's negligence in failing to discover and
remedy the defect).
205. 629 S.W.2d at 701.
206. Id The Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply to:
(12) Any claim arising from the absence, condition, or malfunction of any
traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device unless such absence, condition,
or malfunction shall not be corrected by the governmental unit responsible
within a reasonable time after notice, or any claim arising from the removal or
destruction of such signs, signals or devices by third parties except on failure
of the unit of government to correct the same within such reasonable time,
after actual notice. Nothing herein shall give rise to liability arising from the
failure of any unit of government to initially place any of the above signs,
signals, or devices when such failure is the result of discretionary actions of
said governmental unit. The signs, signals and warning devices enumerated
above are those used in connection with hazards normally connected with the
use of the roadway, and this section shall not apply to the duty to warn of
special defects such as excavations or roadway obstructions.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(12) (Vernon 1970).
207. 629 S.W.2d at 701; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 16 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983) (unless governmental unit has actual notice of injury or death, claimant
must give notice within six months of the incident).
208. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(7) (Vernon 1970) provides that the
provisions of the Act shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon the failure of a unit of government to perform any act
which said unit of government is not required by law to perform. If the law
leaves the performance or nonperformance of an act to the discretion of the
unit of government, its decision not to do the act, or its failure to make a
decision thereon, shall not form the basis for a claim under this Act.
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from liability.2°9 The two courts gave section 14(7) limiting interpretations
that may be useful to other Texas courts, although the precise limits of the
exemption will probably require a more accurate definition by the Texas
Supreme Court in the future. In Christilles v. Southwest Texas State Uni-
versity210 Christilles, a student, sued the University for personal injuries
sustained when a drinking glass he was using as a prop in a drama produc-
tion shattered during a fall at dress rehearsal, lodging a large fragment of
glass in his hand. The play's director, a University faculty member, pur-
posely had decided to use a real drinking glass rather than a glass substi-
tute often used in theatrical productions, which does not break into sharp
fragments. The trial judge rendered a take-nothing judgment after Chris-
tilles rested his case. On appeal, the Austin court of appeals considered
two difficult issues under the Act. First, the court considered whether the
alleged negligent use of the real drinking glass created liability under sec-
tion 3, which waives governmental immunity when the plaintiffs injury
arises from "some condition or some use" of property.211 The lower courts
have struggled with this language, which, broadly interpreted, waives the
immunity of local governments in virtually every personal injury action
brought against them. 212 The Austin court of appeals read Texas prece-
dent as contruing section 3 to create liability when "property supplied by
the state is defective or inappropriate for the purpose for which it is
used," 213 and ruled that Christilles's claim was cognizable under section 3
because a jury could conclude that the ordinary drinking glass was inap-
propriate under the circumstances.214 The University, however, sought to
sustain its take-nothing verdict by a cross-point that raised a second diffi-
cult issue for the court: how is section 14(7) of the Act,215 which exempts a
government's discretionary acts, to be interpreted? The University claimed
the play's director was solely in charge of the play and that in the exercise
of his discretion the director decided to use a real drinking glass, given the
type of play, the proximity of the audience to the stage, and similar mat-
ters. Recognizing that almost all acts of government employees and agents
involve some element of discretion, the court looked for a principle that
would make section 14(7) narrower than a blanket exemption from liabil-
ity.216 The court rejected the federally developed planning-operational
209. For a recent decision relating to the discretionary exemption, see Stanford v. State
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 635 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (decision whether to add guardrails to overpass that never had guardrails was discre-
tionary decision exempted from Act liability by § 14(7)).
210. 639 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
211. TEX REv. Civ. STAT. ANNi. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
212. See 639 S.W.2d at 41 (citing Chief Justice Greenhill's concurring opinion in Lowe
v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 301-02 (Tex. 1976)).
213. 639 S.W.2d at 41 (emphasis in original).
214. Id
215. Tnx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(7) (Vernon 1970). For the text of
this section, see supra note 208.
216. 639 S.W.2d at 41 n.2. This footnote also contains a useful discussion of a point most
litigants and courts apparently ignore: By its terms § 14(7) applies only to a government's
nonperformance of a discretionary act. As the court points out: "In other words, when a
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distinction 217 and adopted an analysis limiting the Act's discretionary
function exemption to the exercise of governmental discretion and exclud-
ing from immunity the exercise of nongovernmentalprofessional or occu-
pational discretion.218 A government should remain liable under the Act,
according to the court, unless "a particular matter of discretion is one com-
mitted to the executive or legislative branches of government which the
courts should not second-guess. ' 219 Applying its analysis, the court ruled
that the decision to use one kind of glass rather than another clearly was
the exercise of the professor's professional or occupational discretion, and
not "a determination of governmental policy of the type the legislature, the
governor, or other state executive officials make. ' 220 Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's take-nothing judgment and re-
manded the case for trial.221
In Norton v. Brazos County 222 Norton sued Brazos County for injuries
he received while incarcerated in the Brazos County jail. Norton claimed
that, while working in the jail kitchen, a bacon slicing machine severely
injured his hand because the county had negligently failed to secure the
machine, to provide a safety guard on the machine, and to maintain the
machine in proper repair. The trial court granted the county's plea in
abatement, in which the county contended Norton had not stated a cause
of action under the Tort Claims Act. On appeal the county conceded that
section 3 of the Act waived the county's governmental immunity for negli-
gence associated with the condition or use of personal property, but argued
that sections 14(7) and 14(9) of the Act exempted it from liability. The
government unit does choose to perform an act which it is not required to perform, and does
that act negligently, § 14(7) seemingly does not apply and the unit is subject to liability." Id
(emphasis in original).
217. Id. at 42. The court described this distinction as providing that "negligent discre-
tionary acts of federal employees at the policy making or 'planning' level afford no basis for
liability, while the negligent exercise of discretion at the working or 'operational' level is
subject to liability." Id
218. Id (citing 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08, at 403-04 (Supp.
1982)).
The discretionary function exception is limited to the exercise of governmental
discretion and does not apply to the exercise of nongovernmental discretion
such as professional or occupational discretion. The driver of a mail truck
makes many discretionary decisions but they are not within the exception be-
cause they involve driving discretion, not governmental discretion. The physi-
cian at the veterans' hospital exercises professional discretion in deciding
whether or not to operate, but he combines professional discretion with gov-
ernmental discretion when he decides that budgetary restrictions require non-
use of an especially expensive treatment in absence of specified conditions.
The government's bank examiners subject the government to liability for their
failure to detect corruption that would be discovered by standard methods of
examination but not for deciding what the frequency or intensity of the bank
examinations should be. The government is liable for its agent's departure
from policies made by his superiors but not for harm done by the agent's
adherence to those policies even if they turn out to cause harm.
639 S.W.2d at 42.
219. 639 S.W.2d at 42.
220. Id at 43 (emphasis in original).
221. Id
222. 640 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
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court first addressed the section 14(9) exemption, which provides immu-
nity from any claim based on methods of providing police or fire protec-
tion.223 Citing two of its own decisions excluding acts of negligence
"incidental to the policy of police protection" from section 14(a) immu-
nity,224 the court concluded that the "particular method of providing [for]
the care and feeding of inmates, including the maintenance of kitchen
equipment, is only incidental to, and not an integral part of, the rehabilia-
tion of criminals. 225
The court of appeals found section 14(7) equally inapplicable. Citing
State v. Terrell,226 the court noted that sections 14(7) and 14(9) both serve
to avoid judicial review of the government's use of discretion in making
policy decisions. The court then reiterated that the negligence Norton al-
leged did not involve any policy decision, but rather involved only the
procedure for carrying out the policy of operating a jail kitchen.227 Again
using its incidental-to-policy formulation, the court said that once the
county decides to operate a kitchen in the jail, decisions pertaining to the
daily operation and maintenance of kitchen equipment are incidental to
the discretionary policy decision of operating the kitchen and are not ex-
empt under section 14(7).228 The court therefore reversed and re-
manded.229 The Houston [14th District] court of appeal's incidental-to-
policy formulation produces a result not unlike the result reached by the
Austin court of appeals in Christilles: both courts applied principles not
evident in the statutory language to limit the broad language of section
14(7).
B. Liability Under 42 U.S.C § 1983230
In Patsy v. Board of Regents231 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the important question of whether the exhaustion of state administra-
tive remedies is a prerequisite to an action under section 1983. Patsy filed
223. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(9) (Vernon 1970).
224. 640 S.W.2d at 692 (emphasis in original); see Cuddy v. Texas Dep't of Corrections,
578 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (action insti-
tuted against Texas Department of Corrections by prisoner for injuries sustained while en-
gaged in a work project for the prison); Jenkins v. State, 570 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ) (prisoner brings suit for injuries sustained from allegedly
improper and negligent medical treatment received while incarcerated).
225. 640 S.W.2d at 692-93.
226. 588 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1979).
227. 640 S.W.2d at 693.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 694.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
231. 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1982).
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suit against her university employer alleging that she had been denied em-
ployment opportunities because of her race and sex. The district court
granted a motion to dismiss because Patsy had not exhausted the available
state administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit vacated the dismissal and
remanded the case, holding that a section 1983 plaintiff could be required
to exhaust administrative remedies under certain circumstances. 232 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding simply that section 1983 does not require
exhaustion of state administrative remedies.233
During the survey period the Fifth Circuit construed section 1983 in
Webster v. City of Houston .234 Seventeen-year-old Randy Webster stole a
van, and Houston police officers spotted and chased him. After Webster
lost control of the van and the van came to a rest, the police officers or-
dered Webster out of the van. Webster came out of the van with his hands
in the air and was knocked to the ground by the police officers. Although
he offered no resistance, one officer shot Webster in the head and killed
him. The officers used a "throw-down" gun to make it appear the shooting
had been in self-defense. 235 The Houston Police Department conducted
what the Fifth Circuit described as a cover-up, 236 and Webster's parents
brought suit under section 1983 against six police officers and the city of
Houston for the death of their son. The jury awarded substantial damages
against the individual officers, and Houston appealed from the award
against it of $2,548.73 in actual damages for funeral and medical expenses
and $200,000.00 in punitive damages. The city of Houston claimed that it
should no be liable because it did not as a matter of policy or custom
deprive citizens of their constitutional right to be free from excessive force.
Additionally, the city claimed that the police officers' actions did not
amount to excessive force. The key issue before the court regarding the
city's liability arose from the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services .237 In that case the Supreme Court
ruled that although municipalities may be liable under section 1983, they
cannot be liable purely on a respondeat superior theory. Rather, the depri-
vation must be the result of an official policy or custom. 238 Thus, in Web-
ster the question was whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
finding that throw-down guns were a policy or custom of the city of Hous-
ton.239 The court found evidence of the universal use of throw-downs by
city police, of surreptitous teaching of the throw-down practice at the
232. 634 F.2d 900, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1981).
233. 102 S. Ct. at 2568, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 188.
234. 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982).
235. A throw-down gun is a weapon police officers, having shot an unarmed suspect, put
at the suspect's side to justify the shooting. Id at 1222.
236. Id at 1223.
237. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
238. Id at 694.
239. 689 F.2d at 1225; see also Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1982) (judg-
ment against city of Fort Worth sustained when unlawful arrest of plaintiff resulted from
police officers' carrying out the policies and procedures of the Forth Worth Police Depart-
ment); Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982) (district court correctly directed
verdict for municipality when actions of police chief in using excessive force in making
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Houston Police Academy, and of a cover-up sufficient to sustain the find-
ing that throw-downs were a part of the Houston Police Department's offi-
cial policy.240 The court, however, reversed the punitive damages
award, 241 relying on City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. ,242 in which the
Supreme Court held that municipalities are not responsible under section
1983 for punitive damages. 243 The Fifth Circuit remanded for a new trial
on damages, however, finding that the jury erred in awarding no damages
for violation of Webster's constitutional rights. The court held that the
violation of these rights was worth at least nominal damages.244
The Fifth Circuit also ruled on a limitation of section 1983 actions in
connection with state-provided tort remedies and denial of due process
claims. In 1981 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Parratt v. Tay-
lor 245 that when a state provides tort remedies for wrongful governmental
conduct, the injured party cannot bring a section 1983 action for depriva-
tion of rights without due process of law if the action is based upon the
same conduct covered by the state remedy.246 This potentially far-reach-
ing principle was applied by the Fifth Circuit in Loftin v. Thomas. 247 The
court held that Loftin, a prisoner at the Dallas County Jail, could not suc-
cessfully sustain a section 1983 action based upon allegations that the jail
had lost $108.38 worth of his clothing. 248 Loftin based his claim on the
theory that the jail had negligently deprived him of his property without
due process of law. Since Texas offered an adequate remedy for Loftin's
alleged damages through three state statutes, 249 however, the court found
no denial of due process and no basis for the section 1983 SUit. 25 0
arrest was only instance of such misconduct and no other evidence existed from which a city
policy of condoning such misconduct could be inferred).
240. 689 F.2d at 1227.
241, Id at 1230.
242, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
243. Id at 271.
244. 689 F.2d at 1230.
245. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
246. Id at 544. The Court reasoned that if the state provides a remedy, a plaintiffcannot
claim the state has denied him due process. Id
247. 681 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1982).
248. Id at 365.
249. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6870 (Vernon 1960), arts. 6252-19b, 6252-26
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
250. 681 F.2d at 365.
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